

# **The Future of Islam in Western Europe: Some conjectures**

## 1. Introduction

I need to start with some disclaimers. I am not a Muslim and my knowledge of Islam is limited. Not only is my knowledge of the relevant sociological literature that exists limited, but it would seem to me that to explore the issue with which I will here be dealing properly would require that there exists much more detailed work in descriptive ethnography on Islam in Western Europe than is currently available, and especially on how this has developed across generations. In addition, as a former student of Karl Popper's, I am all too aware of the folly of making historical prophecies.<sup>1</sup>

I have, however, been struck by what seem to me some interesting problems facing the various Sunni Muslim immigrant communities in Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> I have referred, here, to 'Western Europe'. But, for various reasons, the situations in different countries here seem to be diverse.<sup>3</sup> I will concentrate on some issues which have arisen in the UK. But the topics with which I shall deal will I suspect be of relevance elsewhere, too. Britain, just because it has a longer history of mass settlement from Muslim countries, may I suspect have hit issues which will be encountered elsewhere later.

The question of the future of Islam in Western Europe is worth exploring on two counts. First, as I have explored elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> it is striking the degree to which there has been a decline in the influence of Christianity, in many Western European countries. Second, various claims – often alarmist in their character – have been made about the growing presence of Muslims in Western Europe.<sup>5</sup> They range from points which seem simply racist in their character through often silly claims about a 'clash of civilizations', to points grounded in immigrants initially having higher birth-rates than do the more indigenous populations in the countries to which they have moved, and points about the greater rates of retention, from generation to generation, of Muslims as Muslims than is currently the case within Christian denominations.

It is this last point – and issues about the religious character of Islam in Western Europe – with which I will here be concerned. I will explore these issues by way of looking at sociological literature about Muslims (and at ethnographical work on Muslims in Britain), and in part, by looking at some recent literature on Catholicism in Britain and on the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) in America.<sup>6</sup> These latter literatures are relevant, just because these groups had, historically, relatively high rates of retention of members from generation to generation, and also offered a high degree of provision for social and cultural life within organizations associated with the churches. But there has, in these groups, been a relative falling-off in membership in recent years. There seem to me – as I shall explain – good reasons for thinking that the kinds of problems which have faced the Catholics and Mormons will also face British Muslims over the next few years, and that they will also face some additional complications in how they respond to them. I will also discuss some issues about the dramatic changes that have taken place in relation to the position of traditional Catholicism in Southern Ireland, and some different issues raised by Jewish people who have returned to conservative Orthodox Judaism, which I will suggest may also be relevant.

## 2. Culture and Religion

While there has been a Muslim presence in Britain – notably in some port cities – for many years, Muslims came to Britain in large numbers subsequent to the Second World War. They came, typically, from a limited number of rural areas in Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. However, there has also been Muslim emigration to Britain from Somalia, from India, from various countries in the Middle East, from sub-Saharan Africa and also from the West Indies.<sup>7</sup>

What is notable about this story is the way in which those coming to Britain from Pakistan and Bangladesh typically settled together in poor areas, and to the best of their ability continued cultural patterns from

their countries of origin. There, extended family networks had traditionally been important, and there was a tradition of marriage within the extended family – e.g. of cousins. This was continued in Britain, with marriages sometimes also taking place using links to extended family members in people's countries of origin. While not all facets of life could be continued as they had been in the sub-Continent (e.g. living accommodation in Britain was not suitable for extended families to live together), language and customs were initially kept significantly aligned to those in people's countries of origin.

Those living in specific areas got together, and made provision for their religious and associated social needs – typically, by encouraging the emigration of Imams with a suitable religious training. This meant that, within Muslims from the Indian sub-continent, there has developed a predominance of Deobandi mosques and prayer houses.<sup>8</sup> The Deobandi were formed in India in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, as part of a reaction to British rule, and to the destruction of Islamic Mughal rule in India.<sup>9</sup> The Deobandi continued traditional Islamic scholarship in the Hanafi tradition of legal interpretation, but with an emphasis on argument using the Qur'an and the ahadith. It is worth noting that their approach also included sufism – a concern with the spiritual cultivation of the individual, and mysticism – which they integrated with more legalistic concerns about prayer and conduct.<sup>10</sup> Their scholars wrote – and published – in both Urdu and Arabic, and had wide-ranging international connections with other traditional scholars. They were also subsequently involved in politics in Pakistan.

They have served as a significant influence in reenforcing a conservative interpretation of Islam, in Britain. For example, they have tended to re-enforce ideas about women needing a male relative as a chaperone if they are to travel any distance from their place of residence. While their intellectual style is a traditional, scholastic one of close study of a variety of texts from different periods, without any concern for intellectual context or room for discussion of contemporary problems. However, one must not overrate the degree to which details of such teachings are

taken as a guide to people's actual conduct. And there are also a range of other traditions represented in Britain.<sup>11</sup>

What must be stressed is that for these immigrants to Britain, Islam typically meant, for them, how Islam was understood by ordinary people in their particular culture. Accordingly, young people were brought up in Muslim households and communities. They typically attended local state schools.<sup>12</sup> But they were also then sent to mosques for additional Muslim education in the evenings – which would involve intensive teaching and the learning of the Qur'an in Arabic.<sup>13</sup> It is the combination of intensive socialization in both ritual and teachings, this taking place in a setting in which the culture is shared, together with a sheltering from exposure to the wider culture within which they were living (something re-enforced by racial prejudice exhibited by the wider population), which plausibly explains why it is that there were high rates of transmission of Islam, from one generation to the next.<sup>14</sup>

However, this situation is not stable. For over time, and particularly by the time that one enters a third generation brought up in Britain, things change. These young Muslims typically have, as their first language, English. They often feel somewhat distanced from the cultural traditions which their grandparents brought over from the sub-continent, and seem, increasingly, to identify as 'Muslim' – along with other Muslims – rather than with the specific ethnicity of their family's background. In addition, people who have been successful in commerce, or who have had a tertiary education and who have moved into the professions or politics, have, as part and parcel of this, moved away from the often poor, close-knit communities in which their families had been living. It is striking that the high rates of transmission of belief are reported as now holding particularly for those who remain in the working class.

The distancing of young Muslims from their family traditions has led to a wide exploration of culture and of ideas – not least, in terms of what can be found on the internet.<sup>15</sup> That is to say, it is to such sources that young people who identify as Muslim, but become distanced from their

specific family traditions, may have recourse. However, there is also a problem here.<sup>16</sup> Steven Bullivant, writing about Catholics, quotes the sociologist Christian Smith and his collaborators as saying:<sup>17</sup> 'the single most important measurable factor determining the religious and spiritual lives of teenagers and young adults is the religious faith, commitments, and practices of their parents.' But just what gets to constitute the content of Islam for young adults, once they no longer identify with the practises and traditions in which their parents grew up?

It would seem as if the appropriate answer to this is: it depends. Olivier Roy (in his *Holy Ignorance*) and others have pointed to the situation facing these people as opening them up to a variety of influences and interpretations of Islam. But one of the important questions is: to what extent will those who grow up in ways that are distanced from family-based traditions, and, further, their children in turn, be exposed to the kind of intensive training in Islam which earlier generations experienced within their families, within their families, and also in intensive after-school activity? Note also that the way in which that was traditionally conducted, involving the learning of the Qur'an in Arabic using rote methods of learning which contrast significantly with what children would be used to in their ordinary schooling, might, over time, seem to become somewhat distanced from the kind of culture to which they have become used.

It is, here, particularly worth thinking again about education. As Ansari tells the story in his discussion of 'British Muslims and Education' in his *The Infidel Within*, the situation here has not been a happy one. The situation has been complex. Initially, there was a deliberate policy to try to encourage young people from different ethnic backgrounds to assimilate to British norms and views of the world. This met with increasing resistance from Muslim parents, and there was a shift towards 'multiculturalism'. However, there are obvious issues about what the content of this should amount to, from a Muslim perspective (e.g. what religious conservatives might wish for, might be very different from the wishes of parents who are concerned about their children being educationally equipped to pursue successful careers in a secular world). In addition, there are issues about the degree to which 'multiculturalism' can be pursued within a state education system, in

which schools will be attended by pupils from many different backgrounds.

In this context, two issues are worth noting. The first is that it seems now, routinely, to be accepted that it is children's experience at school which plays a key role in their socialization.<sup>18</sup> The second is that in Britain – and it is also an issue in most other Western countries – there has been a strong concern, in the educational process, with the enforcement of ideas about the rights and recognition of gay, lesbian and trans-gender people, in ways which may create tensions with traditional interpretations of Abrahamic faiths. There is, indeed, a government agency that oversees all aspects of educational policy, and schools' compliance with it, which includes such issues.

It might be thought: would not the appropriate move be for Muslims to found their own schools? There is, indeed, a tradition in Britain of religious-based schools which obtain financial support from the government – notably, ones operated by the Church of England and also the Catholic Church.<sup>19</sup> There are, however, only very limited numbers of specifically Muslim such schools. However, there are requirements to open places to students who are of other faiths.<sup>20</sup> To the degree to which this is operative, it might pose problems for such schools as an effective vehicle for the transmission of religious faith.

It is, however, not clear that even if it were possible to have much clearer divisions within educational institutions (and other forms of government provision), which matched, and provided services specifically for, different sections of the population, that this would be effective, over time. I write this, just because an experiment of this kind took place in the Netherlands where, as a consequence of an alliance between the Catholic Church and the Calvinists, there was, indeed, a broad four-fold division in the provision of schooling and other services, between the Catholics, the Calvinists, socialists and also implicitly liberals (who rejected the idea). This form of organization persisted through the Twentieth Century, up to the 1960s, when it came under political and cultural pressure, and collapsed; not least as a consequence of growing social mobility.<sup>21</sup> While it was followed by the form of political organization often referred to as 'consociational democracy', which accorded formal representation in sectors of government to different sections of the community.<sup>22</sup> It is not clear, however, that either of

these arrangements was really effective, in the safeguarding of faith and the culture that sustained it.

An additional example which is well-worth considering here, is the role of the Catholic Church in Ireland (i.e. the southern part of Ireland, which became independent of Britain from 1922). When Ireland became independent, there was a strong cultural reaction against the dominant position that Britain – and a minority of wealthy Protestants – had exercised in Ireland. The government strongly favoured the Catholic Church, and it has a key role in relation to education and many other social institutions, and was able to exercise considerable political control over what took place. (It was, for example, able to control the performance of plays which it did not like.) But, as Ireland modernised in terms of the occupations which people were undertaking, and as television and a wider variety of forms of entertainment became available, this influence declined sharply.<sup>23</sup> It is striking that, these days, the influence of the Catholic Church has diminished considerably, and that in referenda, various 'socially progressive' measures of which the Church disapproved have been passed with strong general support by the population.<sup>24</sup> It is striking that conservative Protestants in Northern Ireland (part of Ireland which was carved off from the rest of the Ireland when the South became independent, and in which Protestants who descended from English and Scottish settlers are still politically dominant), who used to be worried that the South was simply a tool of the Catholic Church, are now more worried that it has championed divorce, gay rights and so on.

### 3. Secularisation and other problems

There has been a long – and ongoing – debate amongst sociologists, about secularization. Different things may be meant by this term.<sup>25</sup> But if one means the falling away of people from traditional shared religious practises, there seems to be a strong argument that this has taken place in Western Europe.<sup>26</sup> It is striking that this has also taken place among the Catholic population in Britain (who consisted predominantly of Irish immigrants and their descendants), and that similar developments are now being reported as taking place within Catholic populations in the

United States, and also among the Mormons there. I wrote 'striking' just because, historically, these groups had had a high rate of retention of children within the faith in which they were raised. I should stress, emphatically, that my concern, here, is not with the truth of religious views, but simply with the social conditions under which it is easy for those views to be maintained.

It is useful to explore, briefly, why this is thought to have happened, just because they would seem also to be relevant to Muslims in Britain today. Steve Bruce has written extensively on the sociology of religion in Britain, and his argument, that the kinds of lives which we are now living in the mainstream of society Western Europe, make the maintenance of traditional religious faith more difficult than it was in the past. I will, here, mention just three issues.

The first, is the way that the economy has developed, and the way in which positions of many kinds are now readily open to educated women. Young women growing up in Britain are educated. We have already noted that this exposes them to various kinds of socialization in schools; and this may be enhanced in the setting of universities, where there will not be the same kind of relationships as they might have had while they were at school, with their families and with friends from the same cultural background. This, combined with the costs involved in living in a society in which expectations are increasingly set by two-income families, means that unless people are going to remain culturally isolated (and even then, they would need to meet housing and living costs shaped by two-income families), young women are likely to go out to work. They will, in those settings, be exposed to the same cultural influences which shape the other people with whom they interact. (I was struck, in this context, to be told by sociologists working in this field, that the young women from Bangladeshi backgrounds, who are to be seen in large numbers in the East End of London dressed in stylish versions of conservative Islamic dress, should be looked at in the context, not of the contrast with their young non-Muslim contemporaries, but with the expectation that, in the recent past, they would not have been expected to travel any distance from home on their own.)



The second, is that working in a wider setting means that people are no longer subject, in the same way as they were in the past, to the authority structures of their own families. This has already occurred, as a consequence of the decisions that Muslim families have made to send their children to state schools, rather than undertaking education, generally, in schools of their own. This would also mean that young Muslims will be subject to a wide variety of social influences from their peers. (For young people, peer approval is very significant,<sup>27</sup> and in this context the operation of 'like' on social media may

Third, there is the impact of television, streamed materials and of social media. Young people of all kinds are exposed to the full force of this, and in ways that are typically outside the supervision of their families. It is possible for people to confine themselves just to pious or to uncontroversial material. But to do this now becomes a matter of choice, in a way in which it was not in the past.

#### 4. The Future?

One will have to see how things develop. But my suspicion is that we are likely to find that while people from a Muslim background continue to claim a Muslim identity, we may find that continuity with Muslim traditions and practise declines, and that over time the identity becomes a cultural one. This would be about on a par with those Christians who still note Christmas and Easter, and participate in some of the activities associated with those festivals, but who do not significantly engage in religious practises or have any coherent religious faith. Crucially, it seems to me, what will have fallen off, is people's embodiment within, and socialization into, families and communities who share the religious practises in question.

In part, as I have indicated, young Muslims may feel distanced from the specific traditions of their families. They may not any longer participate willingly in the kind of Islamic after-school education which young Muslims undertook in the past. Not only is the style of this out of kilter with what they are used to in their own schools. But, with the passing of time, it is not clear that parents will be willing to assert the kind of pressure on their children to participate in this, that occurred in the past. The young people may identify as Muslims – but then look around to a

wider group of Muslim friends, and on the internet, as to what this might amount to.

In some cases, this may lead people towards very radical views. In other cases, it may lead people to very strict and rigid 'salafi' interpretations of Islam,<sup>28</sup> which parallel in some ways very conservative text-based Protestant Christianity. It is not clear, however, how many people will be attracted to such groups, or how much staying-power such movements will have in the face of wider social pressures. Others, clearly, will be attracted to various other things – such as liberal perspectives, and the kind of package of views which Tariq Ramadan made popular. While such approaches may be attractive to individual Muslims, what is not clear is how these will become institutionalized – and, thus, offer the basis for the training and education of a new generation.

There are examples of institutions which might offer promise to an educated Muslim attracted by a traditional approach to Islam. For example, M. Ahmad in his *Sacred rhythms: an ethnography of a Cardiff mosque*,<sup>29</sup> paints an interesting picture of a mosque which was set up by students at Cardiff University, and now offers a full range of traditional religious but also wider cultural services to the local Muslim community, but which does not have an ethnic basis. (There is, albeit on a small scale, a certain parallel to the very wide offerings of evangelical mega-churches in the United States.) I simply do not know what the future prospects for such developments will be.

I will conclude by discussing two further issues.

The first is that while it is difficult to see ideas and practises like those of the Deobandi playing such a role, there is the potential for articulations of Muslim ideas to play a role as a rallying-point for members of wider, Western societies who are unhappy about contemporary developments, both social and intellectual, in Western societies. My reason for suggesting this, is that something of the kind occurred in respect of Catholicism in the first part of the Twentieth Century. There was a Catholic intellectual revival, consisting predominantly of figures who converted to Catholicism.<sup>30</sup> Not only did they include many distinguished figures, but it has been argued that they were particularly effective spokesmen for Catholicism, just because they had themselves

grown up in non-Catholic settings. Not only did this mean that they had, typically, a more strongly intellectual orientation than had most Catholics who had grown up in the faith. But they were also at an advantage in addressing non-Catholics, just because they had a personal, and first-hand, knowledge of cultural and intellectual ideas outside of the faith. They were, in consequence, in a better situation to address the problems and issues of non-Catholics than were their Catholic colleagues.

However, while, if this should take place in respect of Islam, I think that the Catholic precedent might suggest that its impact may be limited. My reason for suggesting this, is that the basis on which these people were attracted to Catholicism, and what they defended, was an anti-modernist view of things. And while they might have done a lot to make this intellectually and emotionally attractive, they faced the problem that they were up against a shift away from this, not only on the part of the wider population, but also within Catholicism.

The second and final issue, is: what of a return to traditional Islam, on the part of young Muslims who have grown up as 'cultural' Muslims, and feel a pull back (for various reasons) towards a traditional Muslim way of life? There are interesting parallels here, within Judaism.<sup>31</sup> What has motivated people here have involved a range of topics, from concerns about identity and authenticity, to an experience – particularly on the part of women – of the wider secular culture as being unsatisfying and exploitative. Within traditional Judaism of different kinds, the demands by those wishing to return to Orthodoxy became so significant, that centres developed which specialized in receiving them. However, the number of those involved seems to have fallen off in recent years. While the contrast between the experience of people in centres which specialized in such work, and their experience when they subsequently tried to re-orientate themselves in more traditional communities, seems to have been found, in some cases, unsettling.

All told, it seems to me that the fears, expressed by some on the political rights in France, are very wide of the mark. In Western Europe, people of Muslim family origin, and also 'cultural Muslims' with tastes and sensibilities not that different from the rest of the population, will surely become lasting features of our societies. I would also expect there to be small groups of Muslims who persist with a form of cultural

isolation from the wider society, and maintain something related to the ways of life from which their ancestors came to Western Europe. One can also well expect that there will be continuing populations of intellectually-inclined Muslims. Some will maintain, in various ways, the who maintain the traditional, scholastic-style scholarship of, say, the Deobandi. Others are likely to be attracted to intellectual approaches drawing on Islamic traditions, but which are more like those of modern Western scholarship. There will also be those who are attracted to strict 'salafi' readings of Islam, and even to forms of Islamic political radicalism. But these I would suspect to be more phenomena associated with people who find themselves in cultural transition, than anything that will have long-term staying power in Western Europe. All told, I do not think that the French conservatives – or anyone else – has anything to worry about, in terms of being 'replaced' by Muslims.

## 5. Addendum

Just before the publication of this paper, I had the opportunity to discuss it with my friend Professor Neal Robinson, author of **Discovering the Qur'an**.<sup>32</sup> We remained in disagreement about many issues, but in the light of our discussion, I would like to add the following points to my paper.

(a) I would stress that my argument drew on the situation, as I understand it to be, in Britain, and that I was acutely aware that there simply was not the kind of ethnographic research on later-generation Muslims there which would show whether or not my tentative ideas about the situation are correct. Neal suggested that the situation in France may be rather different, as a result of the interaction between French ideas about laïcité,<sup>33</sup> and the greater degree of cultural homogeneity – in terms of the North African background – of Muslim immigrants to France.

(b) Neal stressed the significance of issues to do with funding for mosques and other activities – e.g. from the Middle East. In addition, he emphasised the importance of Islamists, in the establishment of Muslim associations at British universities,<sup>34</sup> and I was struck that Abdul-Azim Ahmed had mentioned to me that the mosque upon which he had

reported in his **Sacred Rhythms**, had a Muslim Brotherhood background.

(c) We both agreed that it would be interesting to see what forms of Islam were developed in the United States. There, Muslim immigrants often had strong academic or business backgrounds, and would, as a result, be facing the problems posed by life in Western societies without the disadvantages that had faced immigrants to Western Europe, who often came from much poorer backgrounds, and were originally typically employed in working-class or low-level service occupations. Perhaps forms of Islam which would flourish in Western, pluralistic societies might be developed in the United States, and then serve as a model for Muslims in Western societies elsewhere.

(d) Finally, I should emphasise that my view that those on the right in France who are alarmed about 'replacement', are based on the tentative argument that I have offered here. This is, that in the setting of a Western society like Britain, both 'traditional' Islam and different forms of Islamic radicalism are likely to be replaced by a largely 'cultural' Islam, which should not worry anybody.

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<sup>1</sup> See on this Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism* [1945], London: Routledge, 1957.

<sup>2</sup> I am discussing Sunni Muslims, just because the number of Shi'ites in Western Europe is limited.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Esra Özyürek, *Being German, Becoming Muslim: Race, Religion, and Conversion in the New Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, and John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006 and also his *A New Anthropology of Islam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> See my 'Je li Europa kršćanska?', *Ideje* (Croatia): <https://ideje.hr/je-li-europa-vise-uopce-krscanska-treba-li-bit-zadovoljan-razvojem-dogadaja/>; the material contains a link to the English version.

<sup>5</sup> A striking example, here, is the remarkably silly Renaud Camus, *You will not Replace Us!*, Plieux, France: Chez l'auteur, 2018. (One strange feature of the disconnect between British and French culture, is that a series of books by Camus and other like-minded authors, which have created quite a stir in France, and have been taken – in the form of

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'replacement theory' – quite seriously in public discourse in France, have typically not been translated into English.)

<sup>6</sup> See Stephen Bullivant, *Mass Exodus: Catholic Disaffiliation in Britain and America Since Vatican II*, London: Oxford University Press, 2020, and Jana Reiss, *The Next Mormons: How Millennials are Changing the LDS Church*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Stephen Bullivant has also been kind enough to share with me a draft of the first part of his *Nonverts: the making of Ex-Christian Americans*.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Philip Lewis and Sadek Hamid, *British Muslims*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

<sup>8</sup> For a useful overview, see Innes Bowen, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent*, London: Hurst, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> See for example Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900*; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002, and also his *Islam in Pakistan*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018.

<sup>10</sup> In Western countries, Sufism is typically identified with a non-legalistic approach to Islam. But in India – and also in Britain – Sufism is integrated (in different ways) with a conservative approach to Islam both by the Deobandi and also by the Barelwi, who are also a significant presence in Britain, and with whom they have had a history of arguments (e.g. about the legitimacy of the celebration of the birthday of Mohammed).

<sup>11</sup> See for a useful overview by a journalist, Innes Bowen, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*, London: Hurst, 2014. Two more specialized studies are Humayun Ansari, *'The Infidel Within': Muslims in Britain Since 1800*, London: Hurst, 2018, and Sophie Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

<sup>12</sup> See, for an interesting survey of this, with lots of empirical documentation, Ansari's chapter on education in his *'The Infidel Within'*.

<sup>13</sup> For a brilliant account, based on ethnography in Cardiff, see Jonathan Scourfield et al, *Muslim Childhood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. See also Ansari, chapter 10, text to note 46, in which he reports: 'By 1969 children in South Asian Muslim communities [in Britain] were spending 15-20 hours a week in supplementary schools affiliated to local mosques.'

<sup>14</sup> See, on all this, *Muslim Childhood*, where it is also discussed in an illuminating way in the light of Whitehouse's work on religious

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transmission (cf. his *Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission*, Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> See the striking account by a journalist, Hussein Kesvani, *Follow me, akhi: the online world of British Muslims*, London: Hurst, 2019. The latter part of Lewis and Hamid's *British Muslims* also contains some interesting explorations of this.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Olivier Roy, *Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways*, London: Hurst, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> Bullivant, *Nonverts*, chapter 2, refers for this to: C. Smith, K. Longest, J. Hill, and K. Christofferson, *Young Catholic America: Emerging Adults In, Out of, and Gone from the Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 27.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Peter Mandler's references to this in his *The Crisis of the Meritocracy: Britain's Transition to Mass Education since the Second World War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

<sup>19</sup> There is a complex story behind all this, which I will not discuss here. See, for a useful survey of the current situation the Wikipedia article on 'faith schools': [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith\\_school](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith_school)

<sup>20</sup> See Wikipedia, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50%25\\_Rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50%25_Rule)

<sup>21</sup> See, on this, Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillarisation>

<sup>22</sup> A key account was given by Arend Lijphart; see *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968, and *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. See

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consociationalism#:~:text=The%20goals%20of%20consociationalism%20are,it%20is%20known%20as%20confessionalism>. for an overview of some of the ideas and their critical discussion.

<sup>23</sup> An important role was played by the exposure of bad behaviour on the part of some members of the clergy, and the church's failure to control this, and the miserable character of some of the institutions (e.g. for unmarried mothers) over which it had presided.

<sup>24</sup> A most interesting guide to all this is provided by Fintan O'Toole's, *We Don't Know Ourselves: A Personal History of Ireland Since 1958*, London: Head of Zeus, 2021.

<sup>25</sup> See, for a useful guide, Charles Turner, *Secularization*, London & New York: Routledge, 2020.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West*, Oxford etc: Blackwell, 2002.

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<sup>27</sup> See, on this, Sarah Jane Blakemore, *Inventing Ourselves: The Secret Life of the Teenage Brain*, London: Black Swan, 2019.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, Kate Zebiri, *British Muslim Converts*, London: One World, 2008, and especially Anabel Inge, *The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

<sup>29</sup> Abdul-Azim Ahmed, *Sacred Rhythms*, Ph.D. dissertation in religious and theological studies, Cardiff University, 2016.

<sup>30</sup> See, on this, Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Converts: British and American Intellectuals Turn to Rome*, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1997.

<sup>31</sup> See, on this, for example Janet Aviad, *Return to Judaism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; Debra Kaufman, *Rachel's Daughters*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991, and Lynn Davidman, *Tradition in a Rootless World*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.

<sup>32</sup> Second edition, London: SCM Press, 2003.

<sup>33</sup> See for an introduction to this, John R. Bowen, **Why the French Don't Like Headscarves**.

<sup>34</sup> Such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and Jamaat-e-Islami.