**Herzl, Zionism and Avineri[[1]](#endnote-1)**

1. **Introduction**

As I write this there is, once again, conflict relating to Israel. There are disturbances and deaths in the occupied territories, while rockets have been launched from the Lebanon and Gaza. Israel has retaliated against Hamas in Gaza. What is more, this has come on top of a massive constitutional crisis in Israel, in which there have been vigorous protests by the more liberal and secular elements in Israel against Prime Minister Netanyahu’s attempt to limit the powers of the Supreme Court. Netanyahu heads a coalition in which there is representation from groups including the ultra-Orthodox ‘Haredi’ who wish, for example, to secure the exemption of their children from military service; from religiously-inspired settlers in the occupied territories, and from various highly nationalistic Jewish parties.

The situation is an unhappy one; not least because resentment from Arabs in the Occupied Territories, in Gaza and in refugee camps in other countries can easily be fanned into violent protest. But Israel’s attempts to control this – together with ongoing expansion of occupation by settlers who see Israelis as entitled to the entire country – leads, in turn, to further resentment. This, together with what in the past has been drastic retaliation on the part of the Israelis upon Lebanon and people in Gaza, has led to international condemnation. Indeed, this has given rise to controversies about anti-Semitism in the British Labour Party; a party which historically had had close links with the leaders of the Israeli Labor Party.

It seemed to me worth taking a step back to look again at how everything got started. I commenced by reading Theodor Herzl’s **Old New State[[2]](#endnote-2)** – an engaging utopian novel about a visit to a future Israel. The picture that he drew, and which fleshes his ideas out in a concrete and imaginative manner, was based on ideas that he had set out earlier in his **The Jewish State**.[[3]](#endnote-3)

**The Jewish State** itself was by no means the first work which had advocated systematic Jewish settlement in Palestine.[[4]](#endnote-4) (To refer to Herzl as having advocated a state is perhaps misleading, as he was writing about arrangements which might be brought about within, and which he understood to remain under the sovereignty of, the Ottoman Empire.) But – despite its character - it attracted a lot of attention amongst Jewish readers, and was rapidly translated into a number of different languages. I write ‘despite its character’, just because it seems to me one of the most tedious – if at times unreadable – short books to have done so well. This was because Herzl spent a great deal of time dealing with ideas that he had about how the administrative practicalities of the state’s administration might work, and also with issues to do with emigration might be handled. All that I can say is that a modern reader might find all this interesting if – like Herzl – they were professionally a lawyer, or if they found such matters as regulations for the administration of local government fascinating.

Herzl, however, was a skilled journalist and essayist, he spoke many languages, and had had experience as a reporter on politics in France. He was able, subsequent to the publication of **The Jewish State**, to play a key and tireless role in the organization of an international Zionist movement, and to conduct diplomacy on its behalf.

But what led Herzl, who was an assimilated, cosmopolitan, secular Jew, to offer Zionism as a solution to the problems of the Jewish people? In what follows I will take my lead from Shlomo Avineri, who has written an interesting study of Herzl’s ideas, drawing extensively on his diaries, and also a more general study of the intellectual background of Zionism.[[5]](#endnote-5) Avineri is himself a distinguished Israeli political theorist, who is well-known for his work on Hegel and on Marx and who also worked in senior positions in the Israeli government. He brings to his task not only a real feel for political issues, and especially an in-depth knowledge of intellectual and political currents in the Nineteenth Century.

In his more general book on the intellectual development of Zionism, **The Making of Modern Zionism**, Avineri places emphasis on the way in which the problems which Herzl was addressing were a product of what took place in the Nineteenth Century. Avineri brings out the degree to which, following the impact of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, one had, in Western and Central Europe, a gradual shift from Jews being identified by – and separated from the rest of the populace by – their religion, and their being subject both to secular restrictions and by regulations administered by religious authorities, they became treated as citizens, formally equal with all others.

This, however, led to opportunities but also to problems. The opportunities were clear: once freed from occupational and other restrictions, in, for example the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Jewish people rose to positions of prominence in many different fields, notably in commerce, the professions, journalism and the academy. However, once education, professional and social life became open, the maintenance of what had been distinctive about Jewish life became more difficult. Business and ordinary school education took place on Saturdays and Jewish holidays. What, also, of a Kosher diet, in settings where it would be natural to socialize with non-Jewish people?[[6]](#endnote-6) From what had been regular features of a more traditional life, these things became matters which had to be negotiated and maintained, perhaps awkwardly, in a much more open setting.

The fact that Jewish people came swiftly to positions of prominence, also led to resentment. Indeed, as the Nineteenth Century developed, Jews could find that they were blamed for their roles as merchants, bankers and on the stock market – and, at the same time, for the role played by some Jews as leading socialists. In addition, the growth of nationalism led to further tensions. Emphasis within the Austro-Hungarian empire on people speaking their ‘native’ language, and pressures for national autonomy, led to a reaction on the part of German-speakers. They tended – in a way in which they had not before – to close membership of their social groups to people who were not German. This meant that Jewish people, even if they were non-practising, and in all ordinary respects secular, and even if they identified as ‘German’, came to find themselves excluded. In addition, Karl Lueger became mayor of Vienna on a populist and explicitly anti-Semitic platform.

At the same time, there was a tradition of explicitly anti-Semitic philosophical writing in the Nineteenth Century from Fries through to Duering, with which Herzl grappled. One important issue – which was a concern of Fries’s, and to which we will return – was voiced during the French Revolution: whether Jews were to be emancipated as individuals, or whether there was room in a liberal society for Judaism as a corporate entity.

In Austria and Hungary, Jewish people found themselves the objects of explicit anti-Semitic prejudice, and it became, over the years – and into the Twentieth Century – increasingly difficult for them to obtain professional positions. It was this rejection, by the people with whom they had identified, and the support for Lueger, that seems to have led Herzl towards his Zionist ideas.

Another key issue, which became increasingly important, was the occurrence of anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia. It would take me outside the confines of the present piece to try to reconstruct the history of what was involved here. But it became clear to Jewish people living in the Pale of Settlement – whose economic circumstances were already precarious – that there was a very real risk of being attacked, their property looted, and of death. This led to large-scale emigration. But this was not welcomed either by the assimilated Jews of Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or, indeed, in Britain, which for a long time had allowed for unrestricted immigration.

All this led to a twofold issue: where could educated Jewish people feel at home, and have the opportunity to make good use of their talents? And. on the other hand, to where could impoverished Jewish people from Eastern Europe and Russia flee, if life became intolerable for them where they had hitherto been living? (Another important issue, with which I also cannot engage here, was the situation of Jewish people in Arab countries in the Middle East. While much has been written of the protected status of Jews within Islam as ‘people of the book’, it is nonetheless striking that, given the opportunity, Jewish people from these countries moved to Israel with some alacrity.)

Before we turn to the ideas that Herzl was led to develop in response to these problems, it is worth posing a question, to which we shall return. If – e.g. with foresight into the current situation in Israel and its relation to the Middle East – one were to reject Herzl’s approach, what would one have suggested, instead? That is to say, Herzl was writing against a background in which Jewish cultural assimilation was being rejected by the Germans and the German-speaking Austrians with whom they identified.[[7]](#endnote-7) While East European Jews increasingly suffered explicit discrimination and pogroms where they were living and were not welcomed anywhere else, as immigrants.

1. **Herzl’s Response**

Herzl’s view was that what was needed was a Jewish state. As I have indicated, he drew up some detailed proposals as to how it – and emigration to it – might be organized. He favoured the idea that it might be situated in Palestine, and put out feelers to see if the Ottoman Empire would allow for its establishment (under Ottoman sovereignty). These were rejected, although Herzl spent a lot of time trying to find ways in which heads of state sympathetic to his ideas (in some cases, as in Russia, simply because they wished that their Jewish subjects would go elsewhere) might advocate the idea directly to the Sultan. Ottoman reservations – despite suggestions that Herzl might be able to ask Jewish bankers if they could supply loans – seem to have related to the fact that they had already, with respect to Egypt, found that they had lost control over lands which were still notionally theirs, when any dilution of sovereignty had been allowed. They were open to individual settlements in Palestine, but not to the corporate and state-like structures that Herzl favoured.

It is also worth noting here that there was a problem which was known to those familiar with the area, which Herzl does not seem to have appreciated. Marmaduke Pickthall – who was eventually to covert to Islam, and was responsible for a well-known translation of the Qur’an into English – was travelling round Israel and Syria living alongside local inhabitants.[[8]](#endnote-8) He at one point wished to purchase a property, but found this almost impossible, because of local customs and entanglements relating to the land. It would seem that it was on the basis of his own experience, that Pickthall was to urge that the setting up of a Jewish state in the area was not a wise move. The problem, in effect, was that Herzl’s attitude (indeed, like that of British authorities) seemed to involve treating land as a commodity, not appreciating the problems posed by historic traditions and attachments.

Herzl had, in fact, given thought to the situation of local Arabs. His (optimistic) view was that Jewish settlement and improvement of the land and economy would be welcomed, because of the improvements to the standard of living of the existing population that it should bring with it. It is also striking that Herzl went out of his way to stress that anyone could become a member of the corporation which he saw as developing Israel, and in his **Old New Country**, one of the characters, who joins the corporation, is a Muslim Arab. Herzl also saw the Jewish state as multi-faith and multi-lingual, and as being concerned not just with the development of Israel itself, but with research for the improvement of conditions in Africa – e.g. the development of vaccines against malaria. Just because he saw the settlement and development of Palestine as something from which everyone would gain, he did not think that an extensive army would be needed. While it – and also religion – was to be limited in the social and political role that it could play.

The mention of religion raises an interesting point. Herzl was not a practising Jew, although he saw synagogues and Jewish traditions as playing an important role in the new country. He seemed, however, to understand Jewish identity in terms of religion, rejecting the British Jewish writer Israel Zangwill’s view of Jews as a race.

Herzl himself favoured Jewish settlement in Palestine, and it was in a reconstructed Palestine that his country of the future, the **Old New Country**, was situated. However, once it became clear to him that the Ottomans were not going to grant what he wanted, he investigated other possibilities. In particular, when he found that a senior British politician was sympathetic, he looked into the possibility of a Jewish state being located either in Sinai, or in Uganda (which were each, at that time, under British control). These Herzl seemed to think of these as temporary options, until re-settlement in Palestine should be possible. However, the Sinai option turned out not to be technically feasible (because of problems of water supply), while the Uganda option was dropped speedily.

Another important element, here, was that Russian Jews typically identified Zionism with settlement in Palestine, and there was already a Russian-based movement for the settlement of Jews there as farmers. A problem, however, was that Herzl had had the opportunity to talk with various politicians and statesmen, and had a feeling for what they would or would not support. Senior members of the Russian government were sympathetic – but only because they wished to get rid of poor Jews resident in Russia. In addition, the Russians made it clear that they were strongly opposed to the involvement of Jewish people in internal Russian politics (e.g. in socialist movements), and that they were also opposed to the strengthening of Jewish cultural identity in Russia. (They, like the Hapsburgs, were all too well aware of the risks that nationalism could pose to what was, also, a large multi-ethnic state.)

1. **Beyond Herzl**

Theodor Herzl died in 1904. I need hardly say that between that time and the foundation of Israel, much changed. However, Herzl was prescient in respect of the situation in Europe. Tendencies that he had identified subsequently only got worse, and indeed in ways that were unimaginable before they occurred.

What might one say of Herzl’s vision? The key problem, it turned out, was that he was quite wrong about the reactions by local people in Palestine to large-scale Jewish settlement, to say nothing of their reaction to the foundation of Israel. Herzl was surely right about the benefits to everybody that could result for the wider population, if Jewish people were able to develop their talents freely: think only of what occurred in the United States. And indeed, in retrospect, it might be said that settlement in the New World would have got over the problems that were encountered in Palestine – not least as there, the indigenous population had been decimated by early settlers and the diseases that they carried with them, so that there was usable land that was genuinely empty, in a way in which there was not in Palestine.

It could be said: but that would not have provided what Zionists were after. Clearly, it would not be resettlement in Zion. It would also not have furnished a national home, in which any Jewish person facing persecution, could assuredly claim residence. But it would on the face of it have avoided the intractable-looking problems that currently face us in the Middle East. There was, indeed, a movement to settle Jewish people in Argentina, which at the time was freely open to immigration. Maurice de Hirsch (1831-1896) set up the Jewish Colonization Association, which encouraged the migration of Jewish people to, inter alia, Argentina, and by 1920, over 150,000 Jews were living there.[[9]](#endnote-9)

There are, however, some immediate problems relating to Herzl’s own ideas.

The first is that there is an ambiguity about his idea of a Jewish state. It is simply that, in his exposition of his ideas, the state is in no sense exclusively Jewish. It is, in effect, multi-cultural, and non-Jewish people can be full members of it. The picture that he offers in **Old New State** is one in which Jewish customs are predominant, although it is multi-faith. How all this was actually supposed to work, and how the idea of a Jewish state (with a right for admission of all Jewish people) would function politically if the country was multi-faith, is not clear.

There is, indeed, a general problem here for ideas about ‘liberal nationalism’. Yael Tamir, an academic and formerly an Israeli Labor politician, wrote a book advocating this, in which she took a Rawlsian approach.[[10]](#endnote-10) Joseph Agassi, a distinguished Israeli philosopher, has also published on this topic.[[11]](#endnote-11) The problem for any such view would seem to me to be this. One can envisage a liberal political community in which there are strong mutual ties between all citizens, regardless of their background. But just who can **become** a citizen, and, in relation to Israel, how does such an idea relate to a national homeland for all Jews?

The second problem relates to a tension which Herzl looked at, but which is still very much with us. He explored tensions between those who favoured the settlement as being exclusively Jewish, and those who were more liberal and cosmopolitan in their views. In Herzl’s novel, this is dealt with by way of a debate in an agricultural settlement, between someone who stands for Herzl’s cosmopolitan vision, and a cleric (whom he names as Rabbi Dr Geyer – i.e. ‘vulture’) who champions an exclusively Jewish vision.[[12]](#endnote-12) In the novel, the ‘good guy’ wins out. But it is striking that in contemporary Israel, things have changed. The dominant liberal-minded and cosmopolitan leaders from the early days of Israel have now been marginalised.

Instead, those who are in some respects their heirs – who have strong representation among the armed forces, academia, and the most economically productive parts of the Israeli economy – are engaged in a political battle with several other groups. There are the ultra-orthodox, who wish simply to be able to conduct their affairs in peace – but where this means being able to avoid the military and civic obligations which fall onto the shoulders of all other citizens. They have tended to see those on the right of Israeli politics as their most likely allies, and under the form of proportional representation practised in Israel, have been able to obtain significant influence and cabinet positions.[[13]](#endnote-13) Next, there are the ‘religious Zionists’. They developed out of an intellectually interesting movement in the United States, which sought to combine orthodoxy (in the sense of a strict adherence to traditional, and demanding, religious regulations concerning daily conduct) with openness to secular knowledge and the modern world. As religious Zionism, this has taken the form of a belief in Jewish entitlement to the entire historic land of Israel (and thus in the extension of Israel’s borders), and the pursuit of this in a vigorous manner. These attitudes have more recently spread beyond those who would identify with ‘modern orthodoxy’. Finally, there is the Likud Party. This was influenced by the ideas of Ze'ev Jabotinsky – a brilliant man, but someone whose political ideas influenced by his experience of Italian fascism, and who championed the cause of violent self-defence. Why Likud has gained in popularity can be explained in part because of its support by Jewish people from the Middle East, who had bad memories of their treatment by Muslims, and because of the influx of Russian Jews, who while typically not religious, had an attachment to rule by ‘strong men’.[[14]](#endnote-14)

But an intellectual problem also seems to have been faced by those on the left. One has had a shift from a tradition of capable leaders who were on good terms with socialist and other leaders in other Western countries, to a dramatic falloff of support in Israel, with the leadership itself seeming very unimpressive. The roots of all this seem complex. In part, it is a matter of it being difficult to get support in Israel or amongst the Arabs for anything that would look like a long-term arrangement for peace. But it seems to me that there have been some particular problems, which in some respects can be traced back to Herzl.

Herzl personally seemed to be influenced by a revulsion against the kinds of occupations in which some Jewish people had been successful during the Nineteenth Century: particularly, various forms of small trading and mercantile activity. Herzl was impressed by the cooperative movement. But in addition, he favoured large trading organizations and looked forward to the disappearance of small traders. This tendency was enhanced by the role of socialist ideas within the Zionist movement. A problem, here, was that – as with, say, the Labour Party in Britain – it was never too clear what socialism was supposed to mean in practical terms; or, rather, how the ethical visions which inspired socialists were supposed to inter-relate to practical measures that socialist governments might take and remain economically viable.[[15]](#endnote-15)

There was, it seems to me, a specific problem within socialist Zionism, because of the romantic attachment that many of those involved had to the ideal of a life on the land. This was to be found in the form of agricultural settlements of many kinds in Israel, of which the kibbutzim are the best-known.[[16]](#endnote-16) They combined an idealization of agricultural labour with – often – policies of strict egalitarianism. But it was also a feature of de Hirsch’s sponsorship of settlement in Argentina, where the town of Moisés Ville had an association with Jewish gauchos.[[17]](#endnote-17) In each case, however, the attractions of actually being modern-day peasants or cowboys did not last; nor did the strict egalitarianism.

Socialism has, quite generally, found it difficult to offer an account of what its ideals would mean in the setting of modern societies – other than a market-based society with a welfare state more generous than that offered by contemporary conservatives. This may be an attractive enough ideal (provided that it can be accomplished without too great a cost to the economy, and does not economic disincentives which lead people to migrate). But this is some way removed from the various higher-flown ideals which had traditionally inspired socialists. It would hardly offer an image to match the kibbutz which would inspire people from other countries. While the realities of life in Israel – including the high cost of defence, the problems posed by tensions between both liberals and the right, and also between the religious and non-religious – make for difficulties. Above all, the nationalistic turn that Israel has taken, and the way in which settlement poses problems for a two-state solution to the problems of the Arab population, make it difficult to be optimistic about the country in a way in which many people were in the past.

A specific problem, here, brings us back to one of the issues from which we started. The treatment of Jewish people, over the years, by other people in countries in which they have been living, has been terrible. The lessons to be learned seem to me seldom spelled out in the way in which they might be. But on the face of it, rather than building endless holocaust memorials it would seem more pressing to diagnose what various specific issues lay behind these terrible occurrences, and how comparable issues might be addressed within our various different societies. This is hardly the place to offer a detailed diagnosis. But three things might be worthy of mention.

The first, is that acquiescence in a culture in which the cultivation of hostility towards minority groups, is problematic. For it can easily be fired up into discrimination, violence, or worse. All this, however, seems to me to need addressing not by pretending that we are all alike, but by polite, open and public discussion of what our differences are, and of how we can best get along together.

The second issue is conspiracy theories. These played a role in the background to pogroms in Russia, and obviously in terms of the intellectual currents which went into Nazi Germany. Here, it seems to me, we need to rebuild a robust public sphere, within which hard-headed discussion about such issues can take place. What is needed in such a public sphere, however, is not bigots shouting at one another, however entertaining some people may find this. Instead, we need discourse within which people admit that they are fallible, and come prepared to explore one another’s views, and to learn from one another.

A third issue seems to me to be more difficult. One of the problems with which Herzl himself was grappling, was the problem of recognising and accepting cultural and religious diversity within a single polity. This has obviously been a problem, historically, for Jewish people within Christian societies. But it is now the case that those with traditional religious beliefs tend to be treated in a highly intolerant manner by those who see themselves as liberal and tolerant.[[18]](#endnote-18) Now Avineri noted that one issue which had been raised by Zionists about ideas concerning rights which were developed during the French Revolution, was that Jews were emancipated as individual citizens, but not as a community involved in concrete practises.[[19]](#endnote-19) For Herzl, this became an issue in Austria, as the liberalism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire started to give way under the pressures of the growth of nationalism.[[20]](#endnote-20) I have already noted the way in which, according to Avineri (who made use of Herzl’s diaries), Herzl came to experience hostility towards him as a Jew from German associations of which he had previously been a member, as they reacted against the growing non-German nationalism within the Hapsburg Empire.

Now I have raised this as an issue in relation to Zionism, for the following reason. Herzl’s own ideal was a land which was to serve as a national home for Jews, but which would have an ethnically diverse population. Absent a two-state resolution of Arab/Jewish tensions in Israel, Israel itself will face an ongoing problem of an Arab population who are citizens of, but disaffected from, a Jewish state. How this problem is best tackled, is not clear. But it is clearly made the more difficult, the more Israel itself embraces a Jewish nationalist character – or, as one might say, follows the lead of Dr Guyler. While, from the outside, the problem is interesting just because this problem facing Israel has something in common with the problem that Herzl himself was experiencing in Austria and which, Avineri argues, prompted him to write and campaign for a Jewish homeland.

To end on a provocative note, one of the key problems, here, seems to me to be nationalism. It is striking how, in the Nineteenth Century, nationalism was often looked at positively by liberals – notably in the cases of Italy and Greece. But as Karl Popper argued powerfully in his **Open Society**, nationalism is theoretically incoherent, while nowhere – with the possible exception of Iceland – does there exist a country which only has a single nation (as nationalism understands this idea) living within it.[[21]](#endnote-21) Not only is nationalism intellectually incoherent, but it is highly problematic in its consequences, not least because, within a nationalist state, the status of non-nationals and of their organizations and group practises, is problematic.

In this context, the destruction (rather than the reform) of both the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires is something to be regretted – just on the grounds that it is within arrangements of that kind, that a plurality of cultures and group arrangements may more easily flourish. Indeed, in the unlikely event that a reader might share my view about this, one encouraging feature in the current political landscape might be the EU, to the degree to which it offers local autonomy within an overarching shared framework of law and policy. And if that can be enjoyed by individual countries as members – with the dilution of ideas about national sovereignty that it involves – it might more easily allow for a flourishing of non-state concrete practises.

1. I would like to thank my friend Nimrod Bar-Am for looking over an earlier version of this paper. However, the interesting issues that he raised in response to it are not ones which it is possible for me to address here. May I also thank Ivan Fischer for his suggestions as to how the paper might be improved. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Theodor Herzl, **Altneuland Roman**, Harz, Berlin: Harz, 1902; **Old new land**, New York: Herzl Press, 1960. [There is a printed and an e-book version of this, available via Amazon.com, of which I have made use, which uses a translation by David S. Blondheim from 1916, and which would appear to have been produced by [sakuramachi-shoin](http://sakuramachi-shoin.com) in Japan in 2017, and Lightning Source in 2018.] [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Theodor Herzl, **Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage**, Leipzig and Vienna: M. Breitenstein, 1896; **A Jewish state: an attempt at a modern solution of the Jewish question**, New York, Federation of American Zionists, 1917. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. For an interesting overview of the history of Zionist ideas, see Shlomo Avineri, **The Making of Modern Zionism, revised edition**, New York: Basic Books, 2017. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Shlomo Avineri, **Herzl: Theodor Herzl and the Foundation of the Jewish State**, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. The issues, here, arise with respect to socialization outside of the home, and with reciprocity. While Orthodox Jews have a tradition of extending hospitality to their non-Jewish colleagues and friends, if Jewish people are observant it may not be feasible for their friends or colleagues to return such hospitality in their own homes. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. It is also worth noting the way in which open hostility towards Jewish people was quite frequently to be found in British literature in the Twentieth Century, up to the Second World War. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. See, on all this, Marmaduke Pickthall, **Oriental Encounters: Palestine and Syria, 1894-5-6**, London: Collins, 1918. This volume is a lightly fictionalised account of his experiences travelling in this area as a young man. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\_of\_the\_Jews\_in\_Argentina [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Tael Tamir, **Liberal Nationalism**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Joseph Agassi, **Liberal nationalism for Israel: towards an Israeli national identity**, New York: Gefen, 1999. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. In the novel, a Muslim figure is depicted as saying: ‘As long as the Geyer policy does not win the upper hand, all will be well with our common fatherland.’ **Old New Land**, Blondheim Translation, p. 70. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. See, for example, the listing at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-government-most-right-wing-meet-ministers [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. See the end of Avineri’s **Making of Modern Zionism** for discussion of all this. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. See, for a useful discussion of this, Stanley Pierson, **British Socialists: The Journey from Fantasy to Politics**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. On which see, for example, Ran Abramitzky, **The Mystery of the Kibbutz**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. See, for some background on this, Alberto Gerchunoff, **The Jewish Gauchos of the Pampas** [1908], New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1959, and Javier Sinay, **The Murders of Moisés Ville: The Rise and Fall of the Jerusalem of South America,** Brooklyn, New York: Restless Books, 2022. For America itself, see <https://www.atlantajewishtimes.com/the-wild-wild-kvetch-jews-often-forgotten-in-old-west/>, and more generally, Moses Rischin and John Livingston eds, **Jews of the American West**, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991; in this volume see, particularly, Robert A. Goldberg’s ‘Zion in Utah: The Clarion Colony and Jewish Agrarianism’, pp. 66-91, which discusses not just one experiment in agricultural settlement, but surveys the wider history of this in the U.S. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. A key problem, here, is that those who favour liberal causes tend to treat their own moral views as self-evidently correct, rather than appreciating that, while argument and learning may be possible, other people’s moral and metaphysical views are in the same category as their own. Our problem, rather, is how to live with one another, given that our views diverge, that we can’t demonstrate who is right, and that, as humans, all our ideas are fallible. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Avineri in his **The Making of Modern Zionism** brings out the way in which Hegel’s ideas about this – which go back to his preference for the concrete civic forms of religious practise in classical Greece over a purely internal understanding of religion – were a significant influence on Zionist thought in the Nineteenth Century. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. It is interesting that in his intellectual biography of the young Karl Popper (**Karl Popper - The Formative Years, 1902-1945**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Malachi Hacohen explains the way in which the Emperor became popular among the Jewish community, just because he became identified with what had become the liberal character of the Empire. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. See, for a useful and systematic account of Popper’s views on this topic, see Andrew Vincent, ‘Popper and Nationalism’, in Ian Jarevie, Karl Milford and David Miller (eds) **Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, volume 1**, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 157-76. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)